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The Missing Link
An Inquiry into Michel Foucault’s Distinction from “Penal Evolution” Literature 
between The Punitive Society and Discipline and Punish (1973-1975)
Sacha Raoult
Introduction
Foucault did not offer in his written work many references to second-
ary sources, in fact he even mocked the obsession with “footnotes” in 
the introductory lecture of  Society Must be Defended, the type of  «useless 
knowledge, […] sumptuary knowledge, the wealth of  the parvenu – and, 
as you know, its external sign are found at the foot of  the page» gathered 
by «people who love libraries, documents, references, dusty manuscripts, 
texts that have never been read»1. This posture is peculiar in the academ-
ic world, although other influential figures of  the 20th century, among 
which the most notable was Albert Einstein, have been famous for be-
ing very sparse with scholarly references as well. As an example of  this 
scarcity, his magnum opus, Discipline and Punish, cites in the early pages 
only two major works from which Foucault wishes to distinguish his 
own inquiry: Durkheim’s Two Laws of  Penal Evolution, a 27-pages paper 
published in l’Année Sociologique in 1900 and Rusche and Kirchheimer’s 
Punishment and Social Structure, published in 1939 but rediscovered in the 
late 1960s.
The edition of  The Punitive Society (La société punitive) in its original 
French version, rebuilt from Foucault’s manuscript and recordings in late 
2013, is an important insight in Foucault’s positioning in relation to those 
two academic works. The Punitive Society is one of  Foucault’s earliest Col-
lège de France lecture, given in 1972-1973 (he got elected at the Collège 
in 1970)2. It is is an important book, part draft, part prelude, part alterna-
tive to Discipline and Punish. According to Daniel Defert, Foucault himself  
did not see a clear separation between The Punitive Society and Discipline and 
1 M. Foucault, “Society Must Be Defended”, Picador, New York 2003, p. 4.
2 Several translations of  these lectures are now in the works.
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Punish, for him it was all «the same project»3. We know that Foucault men-
tioned his work on a «book on sentences» to Daniel Defert in a September 
1972 correspondence, and he alludes to «completing the first draft» in 
April 19734 – a few weeks after The Punitive Society lectures were finished. 
The last part of  the seminar certainly fits this description “of  a single proj-
ect”. In it, we can see “early drafts” of  Discipline and Punish most famous 
points, most notably a description of  “disciplinary procedures” (March 
21st and 28th lectures) and the idea of  prison architecture as a metaphor for 
the modern economy of  power (March 28th lecture).
But the majority of  The Punitive Society has a somewhat different 
tone than Foucault’s later work, and is perhaps closer to an «alternative 
Marxism»5. It is also the peak of  Foucault’s «political engagement»6. My 
first impression of  the first half  of  The Punitive Society was that it was a 
shocking and combative endeavor. The jusque-boutisme and radicalism of  
the thesis that are exposed in The Punitive Society exude a strong Nietzs-
chean posture of  controversy, aggression, desire of  demolition. In this 
paper I argue that this radical posture is in part the corollary of  Foucault’s 
emphasis on two ideas, two kind of  “work hypotheses” that appear to be 
problematic inside the lecturer-audience relationship, and to necessitate 
on Foucault’s part a certain quantity of  explanations in the tone of  con-
troversy. Those two problems are that (a) punishment is a tool of  class warfare 
and that (b) prison is a discontinuity in the history of  punishment.
I also argue that while those two problems were perceived as con-
troversial, needing heavy emphasis and explanations in 1973, the promi-
nence placed on them faded in the following years. Those “working hy-
potheses” became “obvious statements” in 1975. In fact, the link be-
tween punishment and political economy on one hand, and the novelty 
of  prison on the other, are the starting point of  Discipline and Punish. They 
do no longer need demonstration, part of  this will result in Foucault will 
3 D. Defert in É. Balibar, D. Defert and B.E. Harcourt, Journée d’études autour de 
Michel Foucault, “La société punitive”, EHESS, 17 December 2013: <http://www.
canal-u.tv/video/ehess/1ere_session_autour_de_michel_foucault_la_societe_
punitive_1972_1973.13895>.
4 M. Foucault, La société punitive. Cours au Collège de France. 1972-1973, EHESS/
Gallimard/Seuil, Paris 2013, p. 313.
5 É. Balibar in É. Balibar, D. Defert and B.E. Harcourt, Journée d’études autour de Michel 
Foucault, “La société punitive”.
6 B.E. Harcourt in ibidem.
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detaching himself  from the stronger Marxist rhetoric and shifting the 
focus from the novelty of  the birth of  prison to the strangeness of  the 
death of  corporal punishment.
Finally, I argue that Discipline and Punish can be positioned “two 
steps” away from the classical approaches of  changes in punishment 
policies, what was called at the time “penal evolution” literature. In this 
perspective, I see the recently published The Punitive Society as a “missing 
link”, a “transitional form” in this movement of  detachment, distinc-
tion, demarcation from a classical literature that still had strong roots in 
19th century historicism. 
After situation Discipline and Punish in this particular context, I will 
present the problem of  the novelty of  prison as well as the problem of  
class warfare.
The Context: Discipline and Punish as a Detachment from “Penal Evolution” 
Literature 
In Discipline and Punish Foucault situates his enterprise as a clean break 
from a 20th century literature that still had strong ties to the 19th century. 
This posture is similar to one stated clearly in an 1966 interview after the 
French publication of  The Order of  Things: «Je crois que nous vivons actuellement 
la grande coupure avec le 19ème siècle, avec tout ce début du 20ème siècle. Cette coupure 
au fond nous l’éprouvons comme, non pas le refus ni le rejet, mais comme la distance 
prise par rapport à Sartre»7. This notion of  distance towards the 19th-20th 
century’s idols and their way of  posing and solving problems is essential. 
In regards to punishment, the figure Foucault is detaching from is not 
Sartre, but a body of  literature that dealt, like Discipline and Punish, with the 
question of  the modernization of  the criminal justice system at the turn 
of  the 18th century in France. 
A Foucault scholar will analyze the study of  “the birth of  prison” as 
a replication of  an earlier approach already pursued by the author (“the 
birth of  the asylum”, “the birth of  the clinic”8). From this perspective, 
one will describe Discipline and Punish as a refinement and an application, 
7 M. Foucault, Entretien au sujet de “Les mots et les choses”, INA, 1966.
8 See M. Foucault, The Lost interview, 1971, 2012: <http://fonselders.eu/eu/FS_
EBKviewer.php?Pid=6&Bid=166>.
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for the third time, of  the discourse analysis methodologies (archeology and 
genealogy) to another birth of  a “total institution”, in the words of  Goff-
man9, of  a “heterotopia” in his own words. But the birth of  the modern 
criminal justice system was also a recurring focus of  socio-historical litera-
ture. First, we have the 19th century “philosophy of  history”, or “histori-
cism” – that drew several examples out of  penal history. Second, we have 
the early sociology of  punishment that had a strong historical approach. 
Those two literatures have a lot in common and have been sometimes 
been regrouped as the “penal evolution” literature10.
The starting point of  this literature is Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy 
of  History, in which the modernization of  punishment is an important (if  
anecdotal) evidence of  a more general «rationalization process» that gov-
erns human history and defines it «as a progress of  the consciousness of  
liberty»11. To illustrate this progress in the rationalization of  criminal law, 
Hegel refers to the infamous punishment of  the debtor by dismember-
ment in the law of  the XII tables (secare partis) as an example of  the first 
steps of  a journey from barbarism to modernity. The fact that this law has 
for a long time now been considered a fabrication of  later generations12 is 
telling to say the least.
While the 19th century saw the rise of  several Darwin-inspired “evo-
lutionary” theories on the history of  punishment (the most famous being 
Spencer), Hegel’s approach was followed by Rudolf  von Jhering’s, in par-
ticular his Zweck im Recht and his Spirit of  the Roman Law13. Jhering placed 
his historical perspective on punishment as a scholarly application of  the 
Hegelian “progressive” view of  History. Hence, his work is more detailed 
than Hegel’s. It rests on two principles: (a) the laws of  punishment in a 
given Society are, more than any other type of  law, a reflection upon the 
9 E. Goffman, Asylums. Essays on the Social Situation of  Mental Patients and Other Inmates, 
Anchor Books, New York 1961.
10 See E.W. Patterson, Historical and Evolutionary Theories of  Law, in «Columbia Law 
Review» (1951), pp. 681-709; A. Hopkins, On the Sociology of  Criminal Law, in «Social 
Problems», vol. 22 (1975), no. 5, pp. 608-619; S. Raoult, Etiologie d’une dépossession. L’histoire 
pénale comme perte progressive de contrôle, in «Jurisprudence. Revue critique», no. 2 (2011).
11 G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of  History, Courier Dover Publications, Mineola 2004.
12 See M. Radin, Secare Partis: The Early Roman Law of  Execution against a Debtor, in 
«American Journal of  Philology» (1922), pp. 32-48.
13 R. von Jhering, Geist des römischen Rechts: auf  den verschiedenen Stufen seiner 
Entwicklung, Vol. 1. Breitkopf  und Härtel, 1874; Id., Der Zweck im Recht, vol. 2, Breitkopf  
und Härtel, 1905.
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“psychology” and “morality” of  that Society and (b) the history of  pun-
ishment is a rationalization and humanization process. Hence, Jhering’s 
conclusion is that the humanization and rationalization of  punishment 
(which he famously dubbed «the history […] of  a constant abolition») reflects 
the rationalization and humanization of  mankind as a whole. Jhering’s 
approach, as well as Spencer’s, was famously critiqued by Nietzsche in 
the Genealogy of  Morals second essay on Guilt, Bad Conscience and the Like14. 
Those are the “classics” of  the 19th century.
At the turn of  the 20th century, Émile Durkheim attempted to eman-
cipate historical perspectives on punishment from both biological meta-
phors and the philosophy of  History. To that end, he published in 1900 
a paper entitle Two Laws of  Penal Evolution15. This article is a fascinating 
read and a necessary premise to understanding the clear contribution of  
Foucault on the modernization of  punishment. Durkheim’s empirical re-
sources are not different in nature from Hegel’s and Jhering’s, although 
he is more systematic and less selective. Another common feature of  
his approach is that he studies the history of  punishment on the lon-
gest period possible. Durkheim first gathers historical data on a dozen 
“epochs”: Pharaoh’s Egypt, Manu’s code, Hebraic laws, Ancient Greece, 
Roman Republic, Roman Empire, Barbaric France, the Ancien Régime and 
Modern France. He then classifies those countries in terms of  «intensity 
of  repression», and it gives a dual trend: first, cycles of  oscillating intensity 
in repression and second «an overall trend of  softening in sentences».
The Durkheim paper contains several insights that will be present, 
reworked, argued for and against in Foucault’s work. Apart from the de-
piction of  modernity as the ultimate step in the general «softening of  
sentences», and the centrality of  prison punishment in the modern era, 
Durkheim also refers to an inverse relationship between the intensity of  
moral constraint and the width of  moral control:
Telle est la cause qui a déterminé l’affaiblissement progressif  des peines. On voit que ce 
résultat s’est produit mécaniquement. La manière dont les sentiments collectifs réagissent contre 
le crime a changé, parce que ces sentiments ont changé. Des forces nouvelles sont entrées en jeu 
; l’effet ne pouvait pas rester le même. Cette grande transformation n’a donc pas eu lieu en vue 
14 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of  Morals and Ecce Homo, Random House LLC, New 
York 2010.
15 É. Durkheim, Two Laws of  Penal Evolution, in «Economy and Society», vol. 2, 
no. 3 (1973), pp. 285-308.
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d’une fin préconçue ni sous l’empire de considérations utilitaires. Mais, une fois accomplie, elle 
s’est trouvée tout naturellement ajustée à des fins utiles. Par cela même qu’elle était nécessai-
rement résultée des conditions nouvelles dans lesquelles se trouvaient placées les sociétés, elle ne 
pouvait pas ne pas être en rapport et en harmonie avec ces conditions. En effet, l’intensité des 
peines ne sert qu’à faire sentir aux consciences particulières l’énergie de la contrainte sociale ; 
aussi n’est-elle utile que si elle varie comme l’intensité même de cette contrainte. Il convient donc 
qu’elle s’adoucisse à mesure que la coercition collective s’allège, s’assouplit, devient moins exclu-
sive du libre examen. Or c’est là le grand changement qui s’est produit au cours de l’évolution 
morale. Quoique la discipline sociale, dont la morale proprement dite n’est que l’expression 
la plus haute, étende de plus en plus son champ d’action, elle perd de plus en plus de rigueur 
autoritaire. Parce qu’elle prend quelque chose de plus humain, elle laisse plus de place aux 
spontanéités individuelles, elle les sollicite même. Elle a donc moins besoin d’être violemment 
imposée. Or, pour cela, il faut aussi que les sanctions qui lui assurent le respect deviennent moins 
compressives de toute initiative et de toute réflexion16.
This relationship between the width and the intensity of  control is 
an essential mechanism studied in Discipline and Punish, however Foucault 
believed it was too superficial in Durkheim’s work:
By studying only the general social forms, as Durkheim did, one runs the 
risk of  positing as the principle of  greater leniency in punishment processes 
of  individualization that are rather one the effects of  the new tactics of  power, 
among which are to be included the new penal mechanisms17.
The inverse relationship and the overall “utility” of  leniency has a 
more central place in Foucault’s work, where it is depicted as (1) a project 
(«leniency as a technique of  power»18):
[The modern] reform must be situated in a process that historians have 
recently uncovered through the study of  legal archives: the relaxation of  penalty 
in the eighteenth century or, to be more precise, the double movement by which, 
during this period, crimes seemed to lose their violence, while punishments, re-
ciprocally, lost some of  their intensity, but as the cost of  greater intervention19.
16 É. Durkheim, Deux lois de l’évolution pénale, in «L’Année sociologique», vol. 4 (1900), 
pp. 24-25.
17 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish. The Birth of  the Prison, Random House LLC, New 
York 1977, p. 23.
18 Ibidem, p. 24.
19 Ibidem, p. 75.
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The criticism of  the reforms was directed not so much at the weakness of  
cruelty of  those in authority, as at a bad economy of  power […] the paralysis of  
justice was due not so much to a weakening as to a badly regulated distribution 
of  power, to its concentration […] It was not so much, or not only, the privilege 
of  justice, its arbitrariness, its archaic arrogance, its uncontrolled rights that were 
criticized, but rather the mixture of  its weaknesses and excesses, its exaggerations 
and its loopholes20.
As well as (2) an effective, actual metamorphosis of  power, from hard 
and narrow to soft and wide:
Il est certain que cette gouvernementalité n’a pas cessée, d’un certain point de vue, de deve-
nir plus stricte au cours des âges […]21.
This being part of  the larger critique of  Humanism:
J’ai essayé de montrer comment l’humanisme était cette espèce de fabrication de l’être hu-
main sur un certain modèle et qu’il ne fonctionne absolument pas comme libération de l’homme 
mais au contraire comme enfermement de l’homme à travers un certain type de forme qui sont 
toutes commandées par la souveraineté du sujet22.
On specific examples, Foucault often referred to the most serious 
punishment as “anecdotic” and “weak” as well as more lenient punish-
ment as “efficient” and “deep”. For instance on the repression of  homo-
sexuality he stated in an interview for Gai pied:
I do not know the current situation well […] but, until the 1970s, we knew 
very well that bar and sauna owners were racketeered by the police; there is here 
a complex, efficient and heavy chaining of  police repression23.
An efficient system that Foucault contrasted to the «almost inexis-
tent» burnings of  homosexuals under the Ancien Régime24. 
20 Ibidem, pp. 79-80.
21 M. Foucault, Entretien à l’Université catholique de Louvain, 1981.
22 M. Foucault, The Lost interview, 1971.
23 M. Foucault, Foucault: non aux compromis, in Dits et écrits, Gallimard, Paris 1994, 
t. IV, p. 336.
24 Ibidem.
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Apart from these similarities, Discipline and Punish distinguishes itself  
from this literature in three fundamental ways, and it is notable that each 
of  those methodological points are emphasized in The Archeology of  Knowl-
edge (published a few years earlier). We can find those three methodologi-
cal tools explained as well in several later interviews and debates: (a) the 
description of  historical changes as transformation rather than progress, 
(b) the focus on an “historical moment” rather than on “History” as a 
whole, and (c) the emphasis of  breaks over continuity.
The description of  historical changes as transformations rather than progress 
is one of  Foucault’s main contention in the history of  Knowledge. It is 
a strong aspects of  The Order of  Things25, and in his 1971 debate versus 
Noam Chomsky, Foucault was even clearer on his contention: 
For a long time the idea has existed that the sciences, knowledge, followed a 
certain line of  “progress”, obeying the principle of  “growth”, and the principle 
of  the convergence of  all these kinds of  knowledge. And yet when one sees 
how the European understanding, which turned out to be a world-wide and 
universal understanding in a historical and geographical sense, developed, can 
one say that there has been growth? I, myself, would say that it has been much 
more a matter of  transformation.
Take, as an example, animal and plant classifications. How often have they 
not been rewritten since the Middle Ages according to completely different rules: 
by symbolism, by natural history, by comparative anatomy, by the theory of  evo-
lution. Each time this rewriting makes the knowledge completely different in 
its functions, in its economy, in its internal relations. You have there a principle 
of  divergence, much more than one of  growth. I would much rather say that 
there are many different ways of  making possible simultaneously a few types of  
knowledge. There is, therefore, from a certain point of  view, always an excess of  
data in relation to possible systems in a given period, which causes them to be 
experienced within their boundaries, even in their deficiency, which means that 
one fails to realise their creativity; and from another point of  view, that of  the 
historian, there is an excess, a proliferation of  systems for a small amount of  
data, from which originates the widespread idea that it is the discovery of  new 
facts which determines movement in the history of  science26.
25 M. Foucault, The Order of  Things. An Archaeology of  the Human Sciences, Psychology 
Press, Hove 2002.
26 N. Chomsky and M. Foucault, Human Nature: Justice versus Power, 1971: 
<http://www.chomsky.info/debates/1971xxxx.htm>.
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Like the “history of  science” literature, “penal evolution” literature 
had emphasized several “progresses” in the history of  punishment: ratio-
nalization, humanization, softening, “abolition”. In Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault is careful not only never to admit those as fact, but to emphasize 
the other side of  each trend: humanization translate a change in focus 
from the crime to the criminal, rationalization “a displacement of  penal 
economy”, softening “a search for greater efficiency”. The change cannot 
be described as going from point A to point B on a bi-dimensional figure 
(progress or decadence), it is a metamorphosis, a redistribution.
This disengagement from the inherent linearity of  penal evolution lit-
erature is facilitated by Foucault’s refusal to study History as a whole but instead 
to describe a single historical moment. Hence, Foucault on crime and punish-
ment reads much differently than penal evolution literature, there is no 
discussion of  a “trend”, of  “the long run”. 
But it is Foucault’s last point of  distinction, the emphasis of  breaks 
over continuity, that The Punitive Society offers the most information on the 
stages followed before arriving to Discipline and Punish.
The Emphasis of  Break over Continuities, the Problem of  “the Novelty of  Prison” 
and the Opposition to Durkheim in The Punitive Society
In The Archeology of  Knowledge, Foucault would write «I have decided 
to ignore no form of  discontinuity, break, threshold, or limit»27. This 
emphasis of  breaks over continuities is one of  Foucault’s “signature” research 
strategies. He explained the reason of  this choice at several points of  his 
career, but the most extended discussion of  this choice rests in the intro-
duction of  this book. After explaining the social function of  continuities 
in academic discourse:
If  the history of  thought could remain the locus of  uninterrupted continuities, 
it could endlessly forge connexions that no analysis could undo without abstrac-
tion, if  it could weave, around everything that men say and do, obscure synthesis 
that anticipate for him, prepare him, and lead him endlessly towards his future, it 
would provide a privileged shelter for the sovereignty of  consciousness. Continuous 
history is the indispensable correlative of  the founding function of  the subject: the 
27 M. Foucault, The Archeology of  Knowledge, Tavistock, London 1972, p. 31.
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guarantee that everything that has eluded him may be restored to him; the certainty 
that time will disperse nothing without restoring it in a reconstituted unity28.
Foucault provides examples of  the «preserv[ation] against all decen-
tring, [of] the sovereignty of  the subject»29 by the focus on continuities:
Against the decentring opered by Marx – by the historical analysis of  the re-
lations of  production, economic determinations, and the class struggle – it gave 
place, toward the end of  the nineteenth century, to the search for a total history, 
in which all differences of  a society might be reduced to a single form, to the 
organization of  a world-view. […] [Against] the decentring operated by the Ni-
etzschean genealogy, it opposed the search for an original foundation that would 
make rationality the telos of  mankind, and link the whole history of  thought to 
the preservation of  this rationality, to the maintenance of  this teleology, and to 
the every necessary return to this foundation30.
Eleven years later, in an interview for Campus report reworked for the 
Three Penny Review Foucault gave perhaps the clearest testimony of  his vol-
untary emphasis on discontinuities as a methodological choice, a “fiction” 
at the service of  a political truth:
 Je ne suis pas véritablement historien […] Je pratique une sorte de fiction historique. 
D’une certaine manière, je sais très bien que ce que je dis n’est pas vrai […]. Je sais très bien 
que ce que j’ai fait (sur la folie) est, d’un point de vue historique, partial, exagéré. Peut-être que 
j’ai ignoré certains éléments qui me contrediraient. Mais mon livre a eu un effet sur la manière 
dont les gens perçoivent la folie. Et donc mon livre et la thèse que je développe ont une vérité dans 
la réalité d’aujourd’hui […].
J’ai écrit un livre sur les prisons. J’ai essayé de mettre en évidence certaines tendances dans 
l’histoire des prisons. “Une seule tendance”, pourrait-on me reprocher. “Alors, ce que vous 
dites n’est pas tout à fait vrai”, Mais, il y a deux ans, en France, il y a eu de l’agitation dans 
plusieurs prisons, les détenus se sont révoltés. Dans deux de ces prisons, les prisonniers lisaient 
mon livre. Depuis leur cellule, certains détenus criaient le texte de mon livre à leurs camarades. 
Je sais que ce que je vais dire est prétentieux, mais c’est une preuve de vérité, de vérité politique, 
tangible, une vérité qui a commencé une fois le livre écrit31.
28 Ibidem, p. 12.
29 Ibidem.
30 Ibidem, pp. 12-13.
31 M. Foucault, Foucault étudie la raison d’État, in Dits et écrits, t. IV, pp. 40-41.
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Indeed Foucault’s work is full of  “novelty”, “breaks”, “discontinui-
ties”. The main themes of  foucaldian research revolved around “births” 
(the birth of  the asylum, the birth of  the clinic, the birth of  prison, the 
birth of  sexuality) and “metamorphoses” (from thanato-power to bio-
power, from norm-rule to norm-normality). For the enterprise behind 
Discipline and Punish to be meaningful, its subtitle “The birth of  prison” 
must signify novelty, a real transformation, something that needs to be 
explained. And behind the historical question (is prison novel?), there is 
the political one (is prison necessary?), as the proof  of  novelty is also the 
proof  of  the possibility of  disappearance:
[…] ce que j’ai voulu faire c’est de montrer combien finalement cette adéquation, pour nous 
si claire et simple, de la peine avec la privation de liberté était en réalité quelque chose de récent, 
c’est une invention, c’est une invention technique, dont bien sûr les origines sont lointaines, mais 
qui a été intégré véritablement à l’intérieur du système pénal, et qui a fait partie de la rationalité 
pénale à partir de la fin du 18ème siècle. Et j’ai essayé d’interroger les raisons pour lesquelles la 
prison était ainsi devenue une sorte d’évidence dans notre système pénal. Il s’agit donc de rendre 
les choses plus fragiles par cette analyse historique, ou plutôt de montrer à la fois, pourquoi et com-
ment les choses ont pu se constituées ainsi mais montrer en même temps qu’elles se sont constituées 
à travers une histoire précise. Il faut donc montrer la logique des choses […] et […] du moment 
que (notre rapport à la prison et à la folie) est historiquement constitué, il peut être politiquement 
détruit […] J’ai voulu déchoir (la prison) de leur statut d’évidence pour leur redonner la mobilité 
qu’elles ont eu et qu’elles doivent toujours avoir dans le champ de nos pratiques32.
In an Italian interview, Foucault was even clearer on this plasticity he 
was trying to give to power mechanisms, as a self-defined «artificer», «fab-
ricating tools for a siege, a war, a destruction»: 
De ce point de vue, toute ma recherche repose sur un postulat d’optimisme absolu. Je 
n’effectue pas mes analyses pour dire : voilà comment sont les choses, vous êtes piégés. Je ne dis 
ces choses que dans la mesure où je considère que cela permet de les transformer33.
Pierre Bourdieu, one of  Foucault contemporary seemed to criticize 
this posture that placed emphasis on discontinuities, labelling it an “ex-
treme” and a “delusion”, symmetrical to the emphasis on continuities by 
“conservative sociologists”:
32 M. Foucault, Entretien à l’Université catholique de Louvain.
33 M. Foucault, Conversazione con Michel Foucault, in Dits et écrits, t. IV, p. 93.
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[U]n des grands problèmes des sociologues, c’est d’éviter de tomber dans l’une ou l’autre 
des deux illusions symétriques, l’illusion du “jamais vu” [...], des phénomènes inouïs, des 
révolutions […] et celle du “toujours ainsi” (qui est plutôt le fait des sociologues conservateurs : 
“rien de nouveau sous le soleil, il y aura toujours des dominants et des dominés, des riches et des 
pauvres…”). Le risque est toujours très grand, d’autant plus grand que la comparaison entre 
les époques est extrêmement difficile : on ne peut comparer que de structure à structure, et on 
risque toujours de se tromper et de décrire comme quelque chose d’inouïe quelque chose de banal, 
simplement par inculture34.
In Discipline and Punish, the fact that “prison is novel” and that this 
novelty needed to be explored is not extensively argued. Instead, what is 
central to the demonstration is the corollary of  the birth of  prison: the 
sudden disappearances of  the cruelest corporal punishment. The book 
starts with the torment (supplice) of  Damiens and follows by a question: 
how could this horrendous, revolting practice disappear so quickly? «Why 
this universal horror of  torture and such lyrical insistence that punishment 
be “humane”?»35.
The disappearance of  corporal punishment is an obvious and widely 
accepted discontinuity in the recent history of  punishment. Foucault does 
not have to argue against anyone that this “break” happened, that it is sud-
den, unique, and that it needs to be explained. Another obvious and widely 
accepted fact is that this sudden disappearance of  the cruelest punishment 
created an emptiness that was almost “mechanically” filled by the prison. 
If  the murderer cannot be punished by torment, he has to be punished 
by imprisonment, on the model of  other disciplinary institutions, will add 
Foucault. Hence the focus on “humanization”.
But in The Punitive Society, Foucault’s approach was different. The book 
does not address corporal punishment and its disappearance. The “mod-
ernization” discontinuity is still the focus but Foucault examines the other 
side of  the coin, the novelty of  prison itself, not the novelty of  abolition. 
«La prison est introduite de biais dans la trame dérivative des théories et pratiques, et 
comme à l’improviste, de force»36.
The whole lesson of  January 31st argues that modern prison punish-
ment is a «novel» institution, one that has «no historical depth». That 
which was obvious in Discipline and Punish needed to be extensively dem-
34 P. Bourdieu, Sur la télévision, Raisons d’agir, Paris 1996, p. 49.
35 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 74.
36 M. Foucault, La société punitive, p. 86.
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onstrated a few years before, in The Punitive Society, as it may, after all, 
raise several objections:
Je voudrais commencer cette analyse à partir d’une objection : n’est-il pas périlleux de 
dire que la prison surgit brusquement à l’intérieur du système pénal vers la fin du 18ème siècle, 
alors que l’on vit dans une société qui connaît la clôture monastique, une forme-couvent présente 
depuis des siècles ? Ne serait-il pas plus raisonnable de chercher si ce n’est pas à partir d’une 
certaine forme de communauté conventuelle que l’on peut retracer la généalogie de la forme-
prison ? Ainsi en France, c’est dans les couvents que se sont logés les prisons : l’enfermement 
cellulaire des prisons37.
What and who is Foucault arguing against? Two adversaries, at least. 
Common ignorance of  course is his first target, as he emphasized in a later 
interview at the Université catholique de Louvain:
Quand on discutait […] au début des années 1970 avec les gens sur la réforme du système 
pénale, une chose me paraissait très frappante, c’est que, par exemple la, bien sûr on posait la 
question théorique du droit de punir, bien sûr, d’un autre côté, on posait le problème de com-
ment on peut aménager le régime pénitentiaire mais cette espèce d’évidence, si vous voulez, que 
la privation de liberté est, au fond, la forme la plus simple, la plus logique, la plus raisonnable, 
la plus équitable de punir quelqu’un parce qu’il avait commis une infraction, cela n’était pas 
tellement interrogé38.
But the most serious adversary, who is not quoted in The Punitive Soci-
ety, but who will be referenced in Discipline and Punish, is Émile Durkheim. 
The Two Laws of  Penal Evolution 1900 paper especially argues that modern 
prison is not a novelty, that it is “third stage” in a historical progression. 
This element is with any doubt essential to Durkheim’s demonstration, 
after all it is one of  the “two laws” the paper is about (the first is the soft-
ening of  sentences and the second one is the progressive replacement of  
all punishment by the deprivation of  liberty). For Durkheim, prison had 
known three stages in the history of  punishment: a preventive stage, when 
jails were only being used for pre-trial detention and prisoners awaiting 
execution (Socrates jail cell in the Crito is the most famous example of  this 
use); a punitive stage, when the church sought to replace corporal and mon-
etary punishment by the penitence in monasteries; a generalized stage when 
37 Ibidem, p. 87.
38 M. Foucault, Entretien à l’Université catholique de Louvain.
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prison becomes the reference punishment for all crimes. Prison punish-
ment is not novel, it is an invention of  the church.
This is precisely the view against which Foucault argues in The Pu-
nitive Society, stating that «prison is not the monastery of  the Industrial 
era»39. This demonstration is essential and one might wonder how and 
why it disappeared from Discipline and Punish. Was it not deemed compel-
ling enough? 
In Durkheim’s view, the prison is a “vertical” descendant of  the mon-
astery while in Foucault’s view it is a “horizontal” sibling of  its contem-
porary disciplinary institutions (the asylum, the barracks, the manufacture, 
the juvenile correction facility, etc.). What arguments does Foucault offer 
against Durkheim’s views? 
First, there is the similarity of  prison punishment to other structures 
of  the capitalist era. Many of  those points will be further developed in 
later works, but the most striking contribution of  The Punitive Society is the 
question of  the choice of  “time” as the unit of  punishment as a mirror of  
what he calls the “salary-form”, that is time as a unit of  one’s work value 
in the capitalist era:
Salaire et prison se rattachent, chacun à son niveau et à sa manière, à cet appareil de 
pouvoir qui assure l’extraction réelle du temps et qui introduit [le temps] dans un système 
d’échanges et de mesure40.
Second, Foucault differentiates «the function»41 of  the monastery and 
that of  the prison. The monastery protects the inside from the exterior, 
not the outside world from the interior, «the permeability» is «on the other 
side»42. Also, the monastery, while «linked to Sin» is «not punishment in 
itself» but «the condition of  penitence», that is, it gives meaning to other 
punishments such as flailing or deprivation that will be done inside it.
Third, Foucault argues that the “punitive use” of  monastery by the 
Church was marginal and on the decline. «In France, canonical imprison-
ment was forbidden by the Church in 1629»43, and was only practiced in 
39 M. Foucault, La société punitive, p. 88.
40 Ibidem, p. 86.
41 Ibidem, p. 87.
42 Ibidem.
43 Ibidem, p. 88.
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borderline cases that had to do with interferences between temporal and 
spiritual justices. 
Foucault concludes: «I do not think that imprisonment is the secu-
larization of  a catholic punishment»44, and, that is the most interesting 
part, spends the rest of  the lecture arguing that after prison punishment 
emerged as the sole mode of  punishment of  the modern era is was «re-
Christianized»45, «by its base» says a note on Foucault’s manuscript46. That 
is, the prison religious personnel, the intervention of  the priests during 
the 19th century is what gives «an impression of  old age», «a thousand-year 
depth» to «this small model»47.
In Discipline and Punish, this angle will be abandoned, replaced by per-
haps a more effective and convincing focus, not on the novelty of  prison, 
but on the novelty of  the disappearance of  corporal punishment. To show 
the abruptness of  the discontinuity, Foucault resorts to his usual process 
of  exposing “strangeness”. In Discipline and Punish, he makes the case that 
Damiens’ torment is strange and foreign to us, and perhaps traveling his-
tory in this direction makes an easier case. 
Foucault still emphasizes the difference between his approach and 
Durkheim’s work in the first pages of  Discipline and Punish, but the em-
phasis is on the method one should use to study the modernization break:
[To avoid] run[ning] the risk of  allowing a change in collective sensibility, an 
increase in humanization or the development of  human sciences to emerge as a 
massive, external, inert and primary fact […] [t]his study obeys four general rules:
1. Do not concentrate the study of  the punitive mechanisms on their “re-
pressive” effects alone, on their “punishment” aspects alone, but situate them in 
a whole series of  their possible positive effects, even if  these seem marginal at 
first sight. As a consequence, regard punishment as a complex social function.
2. Analyze punitive methods not simply as consequences of  legislation or as 
indicators of  social structures, but as techniques possessing their own specificity 
in the more general field of  other ways of  exercising power. Regard punishment 
as a political tactic.
3. Instead of  treating the history of  penal law and the history of  the human 
sciences as two separate series whose overlapping appears to have had on one 
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibidem, p. 95.
46 Ibidem, p. 92.
47 Ibidem, p. 94.
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or the other, or perhaps on both a disturbing or useful effect, according to one’s 
point of  view, see whether there is not some common matric or whether they do 
not both derive from a single process of  “epistemologico-juridical” formation; in 
short, make the technology of  power the very principle both of  the humaniza-
tion of  the penal system and of  the knowledge of  man.
4. Try to discover whether this entry of  the soul on the scene of  penal jus-
tice, and with it the insertion in legal practice of  a whole corpus of  “scientific” 
knowledge, is not the effect of  a transformation of  the way in which the body 
itself  in invested in power relations48.
Foucault positioning towards Rusche and Kirchheimer’s work is more 
subtle, and in this regard, The Punitive Society represents a remarkable step 
in Foucault’s relation to Marxism.
The Problem of  Punishment as a Tool in Class Warfare
The philosophy of  history that gave birth to the “penal evolution” 
literature became slowly discredited at the beginning of  the 20th century. 
Two famous attacks on this intellectual movement are Karl Popper’s On 
the Misery of  Historicism and Raymond Aron’s Introduction à la philosophie de 
l’Histoire. By the second half  of  20th century “long trends” were being 
replaced by socio-histories of  particular moments. But a jewel shined in 
the ruins of  penal evolution literature, a swan song of  sorts: Rusche and 
Kirchheimer’s Punishment and Social Structure.
The first work of  the Frankfurt school to be published, in 1939, this 
Marxist take on the history of  punishment was to be forgotten and re-
discovered in 1968 – although there was no French translation before 
the 1990s. The book is subtle and achieves several ends, among which 
is the last (to the best of  my knowledge) “long history” of  punishment. 
Interestingly enough, Rusche and Kirchheimer notice the same type of  
“punishment cycles” that Durkheim highlighted, although they give no 
reference to Durkheim’s work. However, while Durkheim explained these 
cycles by «variations in the absolutism of  central political power», Rus-
che and Kirchheimer see in variations of  the harshness of  punishment a 
correlation to «phases of  economic development» and «demand for man 
48 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, pp. 23-24.
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power»49. Punishment is harsher when economic conditions worsens, this 
is the “Rusche and Kirchheimer hypothesis” that has a major success in 
contemporary academia50.
This idea that punishment is not primarily a “response” to crime but 
a form of  management of  social marginality is an essential part of  The 
Punitive Society, with surprisingly, no reference (yet51) to Punishment and So-
cial Structure. In fact, the amount of  energy and examples Foucault uses to 
demonstrate that criminal justice perpetuates a class war is striking for the 
Foucault scholar, as it is not his habitual modus operandi. Most of  Foucault’s 
lectures are about discussing and dissecting a few examples. In The Puni-
tive Society, Foucault buries his audience under examples, of  a criminal law 
forged “against a class” – while showing, as Bernard Harcourt remarks 
in his Situation du cours52, a certain malaise towards Marxist vocabulary (the 
best example being the expression “class struggle” written on the manu-
script, where “struggle” is barred and replaced by “relations”53). 
These examples are the articulation of  a global discourse of  a war against 
the dangerous class that has to be waged by criminal law, a discourse repeated by 
elected officials:
Un député du Var disait : “Les lois pénales, destinées en grande partie à une classe de 
la société, sont faites par un autre […] la presque totalité des délits, surtout de certains délits, 
est commise par la partie de la société à laquelle n’appartient pas le législateur. Or, cette partie 
diffère presque entièrement de l’autre par son esprit, ses mœurs, toute sa manière d’être”54.
By physiocrates, like LeTrosne:
[Les vagabonds] “sont des insectes voraces […] des troupes ennemies répandues sur toute 
la surface du territoire, qui y vivent à discrétion, comme dans un pays conquis et qui y lèvent de 
véritables contributions sous le titre d’aumône”55.
49 G. Rusche and O. Kirchheimer, Punishment and Social Structure, Transaction, New 
Brunswick 2003, p. 8.
50 Ibidem, p. xxiii.
51 As explained supra and infra, Discipline and Punish references Rusche and 
Kichheimer’s “great book”.
52 M. Foucault, La société punitive, p. 295.
53 Ibidem, p. 222.
54 Ibidem, p. 24.
55 Ibidem, p. 50.
The Missing Link   279
By religious communities:
Wesley disait devant un de ses filiales en 1763, que la tâche principale de l’association 
est d’empêcher “la classe la plus basse et la plus vile de la société de se saisir des jeunes gens 
inexpérimentés et de leur extorquer leur argent”56.
By civil societies, composed of  «notables, lords and member of  
the church»:
En 1804, l’évêque Watson, prêchant devant la “Société pour la suppression du vice” 
disait : “les lois sont bonnes ; mais elles sont toujours éludées par les lower classes et les 
higher classes les tiennent pour rien”57.
Or, by Colquhoun, founder of  the first London regular police:
Cette agence aura pour cible propre les lower classes : “toutes les fois qu’une grande 
quantité d’ouvriers sera rassemblée en un même lieu, il s’y trouvera nécessairement beaucoup de 
mauvais sujets, qui, par la raison de leur réunion dans un moindre espace […] pourront, par 
leur conduite turbulente, nuire d’avantage à la chose publique”58.
All references to the use of  punishment as a tool in a “civil war”, in 
a “class warfare” rhetoric is not gone from Discipline and Punish, but the 
focus on Marxism is considerably lighter, approached with more distance. 
Most notably, this heavy emphasis of  The Punitive Society seems to be “re-
placed” by a reference to Rusche and Kirchheimer’s work:
Rusche and Kirchheimer’s great work, Punishment and Social Structure, pro-
vides a number of  essential reference points. We must first rid ourselves of  the il-
lusion that penalty is above all (if  not exclusively) a means of  reducing crime and 
that, in this role, according to social forms, the political system or beliefs, it may 
be severe or lenient, tend towards expiation of  obtaining redress, towards the 
pursuit of  individuals or the attribution of  collective responsibility. […] We must 
show that punitive measure are not simply “negative” mechanisms that make it 
possible to repress, to prevent, to exclude to eliminate; but that they are linked to 
a whole series of  positive and useful effects which it is their task to support […]. 
56 Ibidem, p. 106.
57 Ibidem, p. 109.
58 Ibidem, p. 113.
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Form this point of  view, Rusche and Kirchheimer relate the different systems of  
punishment with the systems of  production within which they operate: thus, in 
a slave economy, punitive mechanisms serve to provide an additional labor force 
– and to constitute a body of  ’civil’ slaves in addition to those provided by war 
or trading; with feudalism, at a time when money and production were still in a 
early stage of  development, we find a sudden increase in corporal punishment – 
the body being in most cases the only property accessible; the penitentiary (the 
Hôpital Général, the Spinhuis or the Rasphuis), forced labor and the prison fac-
tory appear with the development of  the mercantile economy. But the industrial 
system requires a free market of  labor and, in the nineteenth century, the role of  
forced labor in the mechanisms of  punishment diminished accordingly and “cor-
rective” detention takes its place. There are no doubts a number of  observations 
to be made about such a strict correlation. 
But we can surely accept the general proposition that, in our societies, the 
systems of  punishment are to be situated in a certain “political economy” of  the 
body59.
To demonstrate the link between the means of  punishment and class 
war, Foucault gave in The Punitive Society a plethora of  examples in the dis-
course while Rusche and Kirchheimer gave «a strict correlation», for which 
«there are no doubts a number of  observation to be made». In Discipline 
and Punish, like the novelty of  prison, the link between punishment and 
political economy no longer has to be demonstrated. But this time, instead 
of  proposing a methodological opposition like with Durkheim, Foucault 
will use Rusche and Kirchheimer as a stepping stone that one must recog-
nize, but also surpass. An interview given five years later is most telling on 
Foucault’s reaction to reading Punishment and Social Structure:
Je savais peu de choses sur l’école de Francfort. J’avais lu quelque textes de Horkheimer, 
engagés dans tout un ensemble de discussions dont je comprenais mal l’enjeu et dans lesquelles 
je ressentais comme une légèreté, par rapport aux matériaux historiques qui étaient analysées. 
Je me suis intéressé à l’école de Francfort après avoir lu un livre très remarquable sur les méca-
nismes de punition qui avait été écrit aux États-Unis, par Kirchheimer.
À ce moment-là, j’ai compris que les représentants de l’école de Francfort avaient essayé 
d’affirmer, plus tôt que moi, des choses que je m’efforçais moi aussi de soutenir depuis des 
années. […]
59 M. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p. 25.
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Quand je reconnais les mérites des philosophes de l’école de Francfort, je le fais avec 
la mauvaise conscience de celui qui aurait dû les lire bien avant, les comprendre plus tôt. Si 
j’avais lu ces œuvres, il y a un tas de choses que je n’aurais pas eu besoin de dire, et j’aurais 
évité des erreurs60.
Did this “late discovery” happen after The Punitive Society? Was this 
focus on class warfare «something that needn’t be said» after reading Rusche 
and Kirchheimer? From a personal conversation with Daniel Defert on 
December 17th 2013, it seems that it is not something we can establish or 
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Michel Foucault presents his starting point in Discipline and Punish by position-
ing his work in relation to two major socio-historical milestones: a short art-
icle by Émile Durkheim, who was trying to explain “the gradual softening of  
punishment”, and the book Punishment and Social Structure published by Rusche 
and Kirchheimer during the interwar period, which laid the groundwork for an 
economic analysis of  criminal justice systems. This positioning is made on two 
pages of  Discipline and Punish. Thanks to the recent publication of  Foucault’s The 
Punitive Society, we find more advanced arguments over these issues and see how, 
in the months prior to the completion of  Discipline and Punish, Foucault moved 
and refined what seemed the most problematic with modern penality.
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